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Abstract
This paper discusses an integrated model capable of dealing with spatial and
temporal heterogeneities induced by extreme events, in particular weather related
catastrophes. The model can be used for quite different problems which take explicitly
into account the specifics of catastrophic risks: highly mutually dependent losses,
inherent scarcity of information, the need for long-term perspectives (temporal
heterogeneity) and geographically explicit analyses (spatial heterogeneity) with respect
to losses and gains of various agents such as individuals, governments, farmers,
producers, consumers, insurers, investors, and their decisions on coping with risks. We
illustrate emerging challenging decision-making problems with a case study of severe
floods in a pilot region of the Upper Tisza River. Special attention is given to the
evaluation of a flood loss-spreading program taking explicitly into account location
specific distributions of agricultural and structural losses. This enables us to evaluate
premiums, insurance coverage, and governmental compensation schemes minimizing,
in a sense, the risk of locations to overpay actual losses, risks of bankruptcy/insolvency
for insurers, and overcompensation of losses by the government. GIS-based catastrophe
models and stochastic optimization methods are used to guide policy analysis with
respect to location-specific risk exposures. We use special risk functions in order to
convexity discontinuous insolvency constraints.
(JEL G22, G28, C61)
Keywords: catastrophic risks, integrated catastrophe modeling, adaptation and
mitigation measures, insurance, stochastic optimization, insolvency, contingent credit,
CVaR.
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1.  Introduction  
Rising global temperature due to anthropogenic activities are expected to cause sea level rise 
and changes in the region-specific precipitation patterns and other local climate conditions. 
Changing local climate could alter forests, crop yields, and hydrological cycles. It could also affect 
human health, animals, increase occurrences of epidemic outbreaks, and disturb many types of 
ecosystems. A major concern in the assessment of consequences of global climate change relates 
to the possibility of increased frequency, severity, and duration of extreme natural events, such as 
heat waves, precipitation events, droughts, etc. In 1998, natural catastrophes claimed 50,000 lives 
and cost US$90 billion throughout the world, according to a press release issued by Munich Re, a 
leading international re-insurer (this dollar cost is the second highest total ever). The international 
insurance industry paid US$15 billion of the total, the fourth highest amount ever. Hurricane 
Mitch killed an estimated 11,000 people and displaced or injured 3,000,000 more in Honduras and 
Nicaragua. Elsewhere, Hurricane George in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, Typhoon Vicki 
in Japan, the heat waves in the United States, forest fires in Southern Asia and Russia, and the ice 
storm in southeastern Canada caused grave suffering and losses. According to Munich Re, these 
phenomena may in part be explained by the natural climate fluctuations of El Niño and La Niña. 
The losses from natural and human-made catastrophes, Munich Re-insurance reports, will become 
even more devastating: within the last three decades the direct damages from natural disasters 
alone have increased nine-fold [8], [27], [29].  
One of the main reasons for this is the current land use practices, which often do not account 
for risks: the ignorance of risks leads to the clustering of people and capital in hazard-prone areas 
as well as the creation of new hazard-prone areas. For instance, it is estimated [28] that within the 
next 50 years more than a third of the world population will live in seismically and volcanically 
active zones.  
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This alarming human-induced tendency creates challenges and new scientific problems 
requiring integrated approaches, new concepts and tools for risk-based land use planning and 
catastrophic risk management. The existing approaches often ignore rare disasters of high 
consequences, which require a variety of management strategies [3], [5], [7], [34], [37] and strong 
cooperation of the burden sharing agents. Impacts of catastrophes cannot be properly evaluated on 
aggregate levels. For example, aggregate worldwide economic impacts of global change may even 
be considered as beneficial whereas some regions and even countries may be wiped out. The 
modeling of spatial and temporal heterogeneity becomes a critical issue. For different world 
regions extreme events have different loss and vulnerability scales. While the developed world has 
the financial and technological means to cope with these events, for many developing countries 
natural catastrophes may cause major shocks and disruptions meaning increased poverty, health 
problems, decreased water quality and supply, etc. After the Millennium Summit in 2000 when 
the heads of government from around the world agreed to commit time-bound goals regarding 
poverty, hunger, water, education, and health, the adequate treatment of catastrophic event became 
especially evident.  
Following this discussion, the studies conducted by LUC project at IIASA structure the 
issues related to Climate Change and Agricultural Vulnerability to integrate ecological-economic 
analysis of climate change on the world food system. The analysis, in particular, includes 
quantification of scales and location of hunger, international agricultural trade, prices, production, 
land use, etc. It emphases that the climate change issue is global, long-term, and involves complex 
interactions between climatic, environmental, economic, political, institutional, social, and 
technological processes. “Climate change will impact on social, economic, and environmental 
systems and shape prospects for sustainable agricultural and rural development. Adaptation to 
climate change is essential to complement climate-change mitigation, and both have to be central 
to an integrated strategy to reduce risks and impacts of climate change,” say the authors of [18]. 
A recent IPCC Workshop on Changes in Extreme Weather and Climate Events (Beijing, 
China, 11-13 June, 2002, [21]) has identified urgent research and modeling recommendations on 
coping with climate change related catastrophes. They emphasized necessity of consistent 
methods and software to encourage region–specific analyses of these extremes, development of 
regional vulnerability indices, to produce coordinated approach to their management. In particular, 
this concerns the sustained agricultural and rural development.  
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The main question in connection with catastrophes is management of the losses. Until 
recently, losses were mainly absorbed by the immediate victims and their governments, [19], [24], 
[25]. The insurance industry and its premium payers (and investors) also absorb a portion of 
catastrophic losses, but even in the wealthy countries this share is relatively small. As currently 
losses increase, governments are concerned with escalating costs for disaster prevention, response, 
compensation to victims, and public infrastructure repair. It is important to increase the 
responsibility of individuals and local governments for the risks of extreme events and their 
consequences. Local governments may be more effective in the evaluation and enforcement of 
loss-reduction and loss-spreading measures, but this is possible only through location-specific 
analysis of potential losses, of the mutual interdependencies of these losses, and of the sensitivity 
of location-specific losses to new land use and other risk management strategies. A number of 
crucial questions arise within this analysis, such as: What are optimal ways to alter location-
specific risk profiles by modification or/and reinforcement of structural measures such as dikes, 
reservoirs, irrigation systems, etc? How to adapt the existing situation, in particular, land use 
practices, reallocation of capital, etc., to the existing risk profile? What are optimal financial 
strategies for mitigation and adaptation? Where is the balance between ex-ante “here-and-now” 
and ex-post “wait-and-see” decisions? Reallocation of properties away from the risk prone areas is 
an important option, which however for many regions may be practically infeasible (or feasible 
only within the long-term horizon). 
The scarcity of historical data is an inherent feature and a main challenge in dealing with 
rare catastrophes and new strategies. Purely adaptive, learning-by-doing type of approaches may 
be very expensive and dangerous. The role of models enabling the simulation of possible 
catastrophes for designing mitigation and adaptation programs becomes a key task.  
In what follows we discuss an integrated framework that enables to analyze spatial and 
temporal heterogeneity of various agents (stakeholders) induced by mutually dependent losses 
from extreme events. The model explicitly addresses the specifics of catastrophic risks: the lack of 
information, the need for long-term perspectives and geographically explicit models, the 
involvement of multiple “actors” such as individuals, governments, farmers, producers, 
consumers, insurers, re-insurers, and investors. The model combines geographically explicit data 
on distribution of capital stocks and economic values in infrastructure and agriculture in a region 
with a stochastic model generating magnitudes, occurrences, and locations of catastrophes. Using 
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advanced stochastic optimization techniques, the model allows to analyze robust optimal 
portfolios of ex-ante (land use, structural mitigation, insurance) and ex-post (adaptation, 
rehabilitation, borrowing) measures for decreasing regional vulnerability measured in terms of 
economic, financial, human losses as well as in terms of selected welfare growth indicators.The 
approach is applied in a case study of severe floods in a region of the Upper Tisza River, Hungary. 
A Monte Carlo type catastrophe model generates location specific random flood losses from an 
infinite variety of catastrophic flood scenarios. Embedded in this model-based stochastic 
optimization analyses are the spatial and temporal heterogeneities of locations (individuals), 
insurers, and the government to give insights into the feasibility of fair flood management 
programs by taking explicitly into account the burden sharing of these agents. Discussion of 
similar issues with respect to catastrophic risks other than floods can be found in studies discussed 
in [1-2], [11-16]. As it is shown in these studies, the technique implied in the model is becoming 
increasingly important to governments, central and local, as they can better negotiate risks and 
make decisions on allocation of properties, agricultural units, implementation of mitigation and 
adaptation strategies. Also, it is important for insurance companies to make decisions on contracts, 
premiums, and reinsurance agreements. It is also useful for disaster planning agencies, by 
providing a more realistic evaluation of the spatial and temporal distribution of the potential 
losses.  
The analysis of possible gains and losses from different arrangements of the program is a 
multi-disciplinary task, which takes into account the frequency and intensity of hazards, the stock 
of capital at risk, its structural characteristics, and different measures (in particular, engineering, 
financial) of vulnerability. It requires the development of so-called catastrophe models [38]. 
Section 2 discusses the main features of a GIS-based catastrophe model developed for the Upper 
Tisza pilot region that, in the absence of historical data, simulates samples of dependent potential 
losses. Traditionally insurance and finance quantify extreme events in monetary units [10]. The 
catastrophe model deals with events, which are non-quantifiable in this sense, and with 
multivariate distributions of extreme values, i.e., with cases that are not treated within the 
conventional extreme value theory.  Section 3 discusses the shortcomings of the standard "if-then" 
scenario analyses for catastrophic risk management and outlines general ideas of Adaptive Monte 
Carlo Optimization (AMCO) proposed in [12], [13] to overcome these difficulties. This rather 
general optimization technique is compared with AMC simulation as proposed in [32] to improve 
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the efficiency of the sampling. Section 4 describes a spatial and dynamic stochastic optimization 
model for evaluation of the flood loss-spreading program in the Upper Tisza region [16]. Similar 
ideas of Adaptive Monte Carlo Optimization are used in [1], [2], [36]. The model results 
emphasize the temporal and spatial heterogeneity of different winners and losers and the need for 
the cooperation of agents in dealing with catastrophes. The point to make is that catastrophes do 
not exist “on average”. We cannot treat a 50-year crash of an airplane as a sequence of discounted 
flows of losses: the crash of one wheel in the first year, another wheel in the second year and so 
on. Catastrophic losses come as a “spike” in time and space, which calls for multi-agent actions. 
In particular, the solution to catastrophic risk management, especially for small economies with 
limited risk absorption capacity, cannot be accomplished (see discussion in [30] and, e.g., in [1], 
[9]) without pooling of risk exposures. The analyzed in this paper scheme involves pooling of 
risks through mandatory flood insurance based on location-specific exposures, partial 
compensation to the flood victims by the central government, and a contingent credit to the pool. 
This scheme encourages accumulation of regional capital to better “buffer” against the volatilities 
of international reinsurance markets. In order to stabilize the insurance program we use 
economically sound risk indicators such as expected overpayments by “individuals” (cells of 
flood-prone areas) and an expected shortfall of the mandatory insurance similar to our analysis of 
seismic risk programs (see [1], [2], [11], [14]). These indicators are used together with so-called 
stopping times to orient the analysis towards the most destructive scenarios. The explicit 
introduction of ex-post borrowing as a measure against insolvency permits approximating the 
insolvency constraint by a convex optimization problem, whereas the use of the contingent credit 
leads to the Conditional-Value-at-Risk (CVaR) type of risk measures. Section 5 specifies this 
model further. Numerical experiments are based on real and modified data from the flood risk 
studies in the Upper Tisza region, Hungary, [6], [16]. [20]. They indicate a strong dependence of 
demand for contingent credit on the composition of other risk management measures. The 
importance of such an integrated analysis was emphasized in [13], [23], [26]. This section also 
illustrates that “if-then” type of analyses based just on the intuition (opinions) of “stakeholders” 
may easily fail to produce robust strategies in the case of highly interdependent multivariate 
distributions of catastrophic losses. 
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2.   The Integrated Catastrophe Management Model 
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the integrated catastrophe management model consists of two 
major components: a flood catastrophe model and an economic multi-agent model. The economic 
multi-agent model is, in general, a multiregional stochastic dynamic welfare growth model. The 
two main components integrate five modules: the "River" module, the "Inundation" module, the 
"Vulnerability" module, the "Multi-Agent Accounting System", and the "Variability" module.   
The River module calculates the volume of discharged water to the pilot region from 
different river sections for given heights of dikes, given scenarios of their failures or removals, and 
of rainfall runoff. The latter is modeled by upstream discharge curves, which can be significantly 
affected by land-use practices. Thus, formally, the River module maps an upstream discharge 
curve into the volume of water released to the region from various sections. The underlying sub-
model is able to estimate the volume of water discharged into the region under different 
conditions, for example, if the rain patterns change, if the dikes are heightened, or if they are 
strengthened or removed. 
The Inundation module is a spatial GIS-based Inundation sub-model. For the pilot region it 
contains 1500 by 1500 grid cells. This module maps water released from the river into levels of 
standing water in each grid cell and thus it can estimate the area of the region affected by different 
decisions.  
The Vulnerability module maps spatial patterns of released water into economic losses. The 
module calculates direct losses, but may include indirect ones due to possible cascading effects, 
e.g., floods causing fires and their consequences. It also takes into account investments into loss 
reduction measures, e.g., altered land use and flood preparedness measures. Thus it models 
sensitivity of economic losses to changes (investments) in risk reduction measures. 
The Multi-Agent Accounting System (MAAS) module maps spatial economic losses into 
gains and losses of heterogeneous agents. These agents include the central government, a 
mandatory catastrophe insurance (pool), an investor, and “individuals” (cells). This module plays 
a critical role in the integrated catastrophe management model since gains and losses, which are 
the determinants of the regional welfare, and the way they are distributed, have a crucial impact on 
the sustainable development and the overall growth of the region. 
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In conclusions, the five sub-models generate scenarios of spatially and temporally 
heterogeneous losses and gains at different locations for specific scenarios of weather, dike 
failures, risk reduction measures, and risk spreading schemes. Simulation shows that there are 
significant uncertainties and a considerable variability in generated losses and gains. A 50-year 
flood may occur in 5 days or in 70 years. Insurers are especially concerned about variability since 
they may not have the capacity to cover very large losses. In an attempt to maintain their solvency, 
they may charge higher premiums, which may result in overpayments by the insured. 
Alternatively, insurers may undercharge contracts. Insurers are also concerned about loss-
reduction measures. A higher dike may fail and cause more damages in comparison to a dike 
without modification. To reflect these possible outcomes, the Variability module, a Monte Carlo 
model, transforms spatial probabilistic scenarios of rains, dike failures, risk reduction measures 
and risk spreading schemes into histograms (probability distributions) of gains and losses, 
underpayments and overpayments of agents (see Section 5).  For example, it derives histograms of 
direct losses at a location or a sub-region. In fact, the AMCO does not use explicitly these 
distributions. It proceeds with its search for robust strategies in an evolutionary manner by 
adjusting decisions at each step of an iterative procedure based on the randomly sampled gains and 
losses. 
 
• River Module
Released
W ater
River 
Model
Rainfall Patterns;
Geo-Physical Data;
Dikes Modifications,
Failures;
Land-Use Practices
Geo-Physical
Spatial Data;
Released W ater
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W aters
• Spatial Inundation Module
 
 
Figure 1. Flood Catastrophe Model. 
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Figure 2. Economic Multi-Agent Model. 
 
3. Adaptive Monte Carlo Optimization 
Combining spatial/temporal catastrophe modeling with economic evaluation of 
heterogeneous agents opens up possibility for "if - then" analyses, which allows the evaluation of 
a finite number of policy alternatives. It is possible in a straightforward manner to evaluate quite 
different policy options on the type and the level of different loss-reduction measures, say, land-
use modifications, location specific coverage by the insurance, arrangements of pools, 
governmental compensation schemes, or various other financial instruments to spread losses at the 
national and international level. However, such analyses may run quickly into huge and intractable 
number of possible combinations. For example, an insurer in the region can have different policies 
regarding the offered extent of coverage, say 0%, 10%, 20%, …, 100%, i.e., altogether 11 
alternatives. For only 10 locations the number of possible combinations is already astronomical, 
namely 1110 . If running the sequence of modules would only take one second per instance, the 
computer time required for complete evaluation would approach 100 years. Therefore, with 100 
locations the straightforward “if–then” analysis already runs into “eternity”. The same 
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computational complexity arises in dealing with location-specific land-use modifications, 
premiums or investments in different segments of dikes. 
Hence, the fundamental question concerns the identification and evaluation of a desirable 
policy without the simulation of all possible options. The complexity of this task is due to 
analytical intractability of stochastic catastrophe models, often precluding the use of standard 
optimization methods, e.g., genetic algorithms. Therefore, in general, we have to rely on stochastic 
optimization methods [16], in particular, on the so-called Adaptive Monte Carlo Optimization 
(AMCO) [12], [13]. “Adaptive Monte Carlo” [32] means a technique that makes on-line use of 
sampling information to sequentially improve the efficiency of the sampling itself. We use AMCO 
in a rather broad sense, i.e. the efficiency of the sampling procedure is considered as part of more 
general improvements with respect to different decisions and goals. The AMCO model for the 
Upper Tisza region consists of three interacting blocks: (i) Feasible decisions, (ii) the Monte Carlo 
Catastrophe model, and (iii) Performance indicators (Figure 3).  
 
Feasible
Decisions
IndicatorsCatastrophe
Model
 
 
Figure 3. The Adaptive Monte Carlo Optimization Model 
 
The block “Feasible Decisions” represents the set of all feasible policies, i.e., all technically, 
legally and financially possible options for coping with floods. In general, they may include 
altering heights of dikes, different levels of insurance coverage, land use modifications, crop 
structure portfolio, etc. These variables affect performance indicators such as profits of farmers, 
producers, consumers, insurers, underpayments or overpayments by the insured, costs, insolvency 
and stability indicators.  
The essential feature is the feedback mechanism updating, based on evaluation of 
performance indicators, decisions towards specific goals of agents. The updating procedure relies 
on stochastic optimization techniques as is discussed in Section 5. Gains and losses are simulated 
by the catastrophe model, causing an iterative revision of the decision variables after each 
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simulation run. In a sense, the AMCO procedure simulates in a remarkably simple and 
evolutionary manner the learning and adaptation process on the basis of the simulated reversible 
history of catastrophic events. This technique is unavoidable when the outcomes of the catastrophe 
model do not have a well-defined analytical structure. 
4. The Stochastic Optimization Model  
Stochastic optimization provides a framework for the iterative revision of decisions 
embedded in the catastrophe evaluation model. These decisions influence the magnitude and 
distribution of location-specific risks and contributions to the overall catastrophe losses. In the 
model for the Upper Tisza region we use approaches similar to those adopted in [1-2], [13-15] for 
seismic risks. The main idea is based on subdividing the study region into risk-homogeneous land 
units, represented by grid-cells mj ,...,2,1= . These cells may correspond to a collection of 
households at a certain site, a collection of locations (zones) with similar land-use structure, an 
administrative district, or a grid with a segment of a gas pipeline. The choice of cells provides a 
desirable representation of losses. In our case, the cells consist of the value of the physical 
structures. Catastrophes, which are simulated by the catastrophe model, randomly affect different 
cells and produce mutually dependent losses tjL  at time t . These losses depend on various decision 
variables. Some decisions reduce losses, say a dike, whereas others spread them at a regional, 
national, and international level, e.g., insurance contracts, catastrophe securities, credits, and 
financial aid. If ),...,,( 21 nxxxx =  is the vector of decision variables, then losses tjL  in a cell j  at 
time t  are transformed into )(xLtj . In the case of the Tisza river, for example, we can think of 
)(xLtj  as tjL  being affected by the decisions of the insurance to cover losses from an interval 
],[ 21 jj xx  for a cell j  in the case of a flood disaster at time t :  
[ ]{ } tjjtjjjtjtj xLxxLxL pi++−= 121 ,min,max)( , (1) 
where [ ]{ } 121 jtjjj xLxx −,min,max  are retained by insurance losses, and tjpi  is a premium 
function. The variable 1jx  defines the deductible part ("trigger") of the contract and 2jx  defines 
its "cap".  
In the most general case, vector x  comprises decision variables of different agents, 
including government decisions, such as the height of a new dike or a public compensation 
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scheme defined by a fraction of total losses ∑ =mj tjL1 . The insurance decisions concern premiums 
paid by individuals and the payments of claims in the case of catastrophe. There are complex 
interdependencies among these decisions, which call for the cooperation of agents. For example, 
the partial compensation of catastrophe losses by the government enforces decisions on loss 
reductions by individuals and, hence, increases the insurability of risks, and helps the insurance to 
avoid insolvency. On the other hand, the insurance combined with individual and governmental 
risk-reduction measures can reduce losses, compensations and government debt, and can stabilize 
the economic growth of the region and the wealth of individuals. 
Let us now turn to considering a potential insurance system for Hungary and introduce some 
important indicators. In the following we do not, for simplicity of notation, consider the most 
general situation, i.e., we consider only a proportional compensation scheme by the government, 
proportional insurance coverages, and we do not use discount factors.  
In this application the system is modeled until a first catastrophic flood, which occurs within 
a given time horizon. We define this time point as the stopping time. For the Upper Tisza region 
this event is associated with the breaking of a dike, which may occur only after a 100-year, 150- or 
1000-year flood. Floods are characterized by upstream discharge curves and the probability of 
breaking each of the three dikes. The occurrence of the first catastrophic flood significantly affects 
the accumulation of risk reserves by the insurance, and total payments of individuals; for example, 
a 100-year flood, with the break of a dike, may occur in two years, and this may lead to significant 
underpayments to insurance. 
Let τ  be a random (stopping) time to a first catastrophe within a time interval ],0[ T , where 
T  is some planning horizon, say, of 10 or 50 years. If no catastrophe occurs, then T=τ . Since τ  
is associated with the break of a dike, the probability distribution of τ  is, in general, affected by 
some components of vector x , e.g., by decisions on dike modifications, land use changes, 
construction of reservoirs, etc. Here, we discuss only the case when τ  does not depend on x .  
Let τjL  be random losses at location j  at time τ=t . In our analysis we assess the capacity 
of a catastrophe insurance scheme in the upper Tisza region only with respect to financial loss-
spreading decisions. Let us use a special notation for the elements of the scheme such as jpi , jϕ , 
ν , q , y . Let jpi  denote the premium rate paid by location j  to the mandatory insurance, then 
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the accumulated mutual catastrophe fund at time τ  including the proportional compensation 
∑
j j
Lτν  by the government amounts to ∑ ϕ−∑ν+∑ piτ ττ
j
jj
j
j
j
j LL , where 10 ≤ϕ≤ j , is the 
insurance coverage for cell j . Thus, in this model we assume that the compensation to flood 
victims by the government is paid through the mandatory insurance. 
The stability of the insurance program depends on whether the accumulated mutual fund 
together with the governmental compensation is able to cover claims, i.e., on the probability of 
event: 
01 ≥∑ ϕ−∑ν+∑ piτ= ττ
j
jj
j
j
j
j LLe  . (2) 
The stability also depends on the willingness of individuals to accept premiums, i.e., with the 
probability of overpayments: 
02 ≥ϕ−τpi= τjjj Le ,  mj ,...,1= . (3) 
Apart from the compensation ∑ν τ
j
j xL )(  the government arranges a contingent credit y  with a fee 
q  to improve the stability of the mandatory insurance (pool) by transforming event (2) into (4): 
03 ≥τ−+∑ ϕ−∑ν+∑ piτ= ττ qyyLLe
j
jj
j
j
j
j . (4) 
Constraints (3), (4) describe the burden sharing within the program. Here we assume that the 
mandatory insurance pays the fee qyτ  and receives a credit y , whereas the government pays back 
the credit with the interest rate y γ , 1>γ . 
The difference between compensation ∑ν τ
j
jL  and contingent credit y  is significant: the outflow 
of fees is smooth, whereas the compensation of claims has a sudden impact at time τ , and without 
y  it may require a higher government compensation (greater ν ) possibly exceeding the available 
budget. Therefore, without ex-ante contingent injections of capital y  the diversion of capital from 
other government expenditures may occur.  
Let us note that the budget constraint, which raises a general question on the optimal 
dynamic management of the available budget in order to increase the stability of the mandatory 
insurance and its efficiency. For example, besides the contingent credit, a reasonable option may 
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also be to invest some money in liquid assets. The main aim of our analysis is narrower: the 
evaluation of the mandatory insurance capacity and the demand for contingent credit.  
Inequalities (3)–(4) define important events, constraining the choice of decision variables, 
which determine the insurance program, i.e., the compensation rate ν  by the government, 
coverage rates by the insurance company jϕ , premiums jpi , and credit y  with fee q . The 
probability of events (3)-(4), i.e., overpayments by individuals and underpayments to the pool, 
determine the stability (resilience) of the scheme. This can be expressed in terms of the 
probabilistic constraint 
[ ] peeP ≤<> 0,0 32 , (5) 
where p  is a desirable probability of the program’s failure (default), that occurs, say, only once in 
100 years. Constraint (5) is similar to insolvency constraint [35], a standard for regulations of the 
insurance business. In stochastic optimization [17] constraint (5) is known as the so-called chance 
constraint. Note, however, that this constraint does not account for the attained values of 2e  and 
3e , what is important for the government, since it cannot walk away from the region in a distress. 
The main goal in setting up the insurance scheme can now be formulated as the minimization of 
expected total losses yLExF
j
jj γ+∑ ϕ−= τ)1()(  including uncovered (uninsured) losses by the 
insurance scheme and the cost of credit yγ , subject to chance constraint (5), where vector x  
consists of the components jpi , jϕ , y . 
Constraint (5) imposes significant methodological challenges even in cases when )(xτ  does 
not depend on x  and events (3)-(4) are defined by linear functions of decision variables (see 
discussion in [17], p. 8, and in [13-15]). This constraint is of “black-and-white” character, i.e., it 
accounts only for a violation of (3)-(4) but not for the magnitude of violation. There are important 
connections between the minimization of )(xF  subject to highly non-linear and possibly 
discontinuous chance constraints (5) and the minimization of convex functions, which have 
important economic interpretations. Consider the following function 
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{ }
{ }∑ ϕ−τpi
+τ+∑ ∑ −∑ piτ−ν−ϕα+=
τ
ττ
j jjj
j j j jjjj
LβE
qyyLLExFxG
, ,0max           
,0max)()(
  (6) 
 
where βα,  are positive parameters.  
It is possible to proof (see chapter 2 in [17] and more general results in [13-15]) that for 
large enough βα,  the minimization of function )(xG  generates solutions x  with )(xF  
approaching the minimum of )(xF  subject to (5) for any given level p .  
The minimization of )(xG  as defined by (6) has a simple economic interpretation. Function 
)(xF  comprises expected direct losses associated with the insurance program. The second term 
quantifies the expected shortfall of the program to fulfill its obligations; it can be viewed as the 
expected amount of ex-post borrowing with a fee α  needed for this purpose. Similarly, the third 
term can be interpreted as the expected ex-post borrowing with a fee β  needed to compensate 
overpayments. Obviously, large enough fees α , β  will tend to preclude the violation of (3)-(4). 
Thus, ex-post borrowing with large enough fees allows for a control of the insolvency constraints 
(5). It is easy to see that the use of the ex-post borrowing (expected shortfall) in the second term of 
)(xG  in combination with the optimal ex-ante contingent credit y  controls the CVaR type risk 
measures. Indeed, the minimization of )(xG  is an example of stochastic minimax problems (see 
[17], chapter 22). By using standard optimality conditions for these problems we can derive the 
optimality conditions for the contingent credit y . For example, assuming continuous 
differentiability of )(xG  which follows in particular from the continuity of underlying probability 
distributions, it is easy to see that the optimal level of the credit 0>y  must satisfy the equation 
 
0=

∑ ∑ >∑ piτ−ν−ϕα−γ=∂
∂ ττ
j j j
jjjj yLLPy
G
. (7)   
 
Thus, the optimal amount of the contingent credit is defined as a fraction of the random 
variable ∑ ∑ ∑ piτ−ν−ϕ ττ
j j j
jjjj LL  specified by the ratio αγ / , which has to be less or equal 1. 
Hence, the expectation in the second term of )(xG  for optimal y  is taken under the condition that 
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y  is a quantile of ∑ ∑ ∑ piτ−ν−ϕ ττ
j j j
jjjj LL . This is in accordance with the definition of CVaR [4], 
[28]. More general risk measures emerge from the optimality conditions of )(xG  with respect to 
premiums jpi , jϕ .  
The importance of an economically sound risk measure, such as expected shortfall, was 
emphasized by many authors (see [4], [10], [22], [33]). Important connections of CVaR with the 
linear programs were discussed in [4], [25]. Let us note that )(xG  is a convex function in the case 
when τ  and τjL  do not depend on x . In this case the stochastic minimax problem (6) can be 
approximately solved by linear programming methods (see general discussion in [11]).  The main 
challenge is concerned with the case when τ  and τL  are implicit functions of x . Then we can 
only use the Adaptive Monte Carlo optimization. Let us outline only the main idea of this 
technique. More details and further references can be found in [12-15].  
Assume that vector x  incorporates not only risk management decision variables but also 
includes components affecting the efficiency of the sampling itself (for more detail see [12], [13], 
[32]). An Adaptive Monte Carlo procedure searching for a solution minimizing )(xG  of type (6) 
starts at any reasonable initial guess 0x . It updates the solution iteratively at steps ,...,1,0=k  by 
the rule  kk
kk xx ξρ−=+1 , where numbers 0>ρk  are predetermined step-sizes satisfying the 
condition ∑ ∞=ρ
∞
=0k
k , ∑ ∞=ρ
∞
=0
2
k
k . For example, the specification )1/(1 +=ρ kk  would suit. 
Random vector kξ  is an estimate of the gradient )(xGx  or its analogs for the non-smooth function 
)(xG . This vector is easily computed from random observations of )(xG . For example, let kG  be 
a random observation of )(xG  at kxx =  and kG~  be a random observation of )(xG  at 
k
k
k hxx δ+= . The numbers kδ  are positive, 0→δk , ∞→k , and kh  is an independent 
observation of the vector h  with elements independent and uniformly distributed on ]1,1[−  
components. Then kξ  can be chosen as ( )[ ] kkkkk hGG  /~ δ−=ξ . The formal analysis of this 
method, in particular for discontinuous goal functions, is based on general ideas of the stochastic 
quasigradient methods (see [17] and further references in [13-15]). 
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5. Numerical Experiments   
In this section we discuss some numerical experiments using data collected in the Upper 
Tisza region. The main purpose of the following discussion is the illustration of the proposed 
model rather than the numerical results of our findings. Therefore, in what follows we use some 
simplified assumptions.  
The case study region consists of 1500 x 1500 grid-cells. For each grid there are data on the 
property value and vulnerability of its content. For policy analysis these grid-cells are further 
aggregated into 40 locations/municipalities. 
In the numerical experiments we analyzed outcomes under different assumptions suggested 
by various stakeholders involved in these studies, in particular, policies on premiums jpi , 
mj ,...,1= , where m  is the number of locations, in our case 40=m . These assumptions reflect 
different views of stakeholders on potential flood loss sharing programs in the region. We show 
that they significantly affect spatial and temporal heterogeneity of individuals, the insurance, and 
the government. In these experiments the demand for government intervention is modeled as the 
demand for the contingent credit, whereas the burden sharing by individuals and the insurance 
pool are defined by the distribution of constraint vector e  and the distribution of the left hand side 
of stability constraint (5).  Here we discuss only the following two options for premium 
calculation: 
1. Premiums calculated according to the actuarial principle based on location-specific 
average losses. 
2. “Fair” robust premiums calculated by minimization of function (6). This takes into 
account the distribution of losses for each location, and considerations of fair prices 
defined by (3), (4). 
Flood occurrences are modeled according to specified probabilities [31] of heavy rainfall 
events and dike breaks. There are three dikes located along the pilot river branch. Each of them 
may break with some probability in 100-year, 150-year, and 1000-year flood. Here we only take 
into account structural losses. The simulation time horizon is 50 years. The number of random 
simulations (scenarios) per experiment is 10000. A contingent credit in our model is introduced to 
stabilize equation (2) in correspondence with equation (4). The demand for credit (the burden of 
the government) is, therefore, defined by negative values of indicator 1e  or 3e  for optimal 
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solutions jϕ , jpi  minimizing (6) for 0=y  and given ν . This defines also the lack of capacity 
(the burden sharing) for the mandatory insurance. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the results of the 
experiments with 25.0=ν , 0=y . The horizontal axis shows the total demand for contingent 
credit, negative 1e , whereas the vertical axis shows the number of simulations and the cumulative 
probability. 
In practical calculations (see [1], [2], [11], [12] and Section 5) histograms for constraints (5) 
calculated simultaneously with the minimization of (6) provide a signal for increasing or 
decreasing “penalties” (risk factors) α , β  to achieve a satisfactory level p . Intuitively, greater 
values α , β  lead to constraints (5) with smaller p . On the other hand, this may considerably 
reduce insurance coverage of catastrophic exposures. The trade-off between these two effects can 
be resolved by using some additional criteria, e.g., political considerations or purely visual 
character of histograms, which cannot be formalized in general.  
According to our experiments, the premium for the first option equals on average (per 
location and year) 0.87 million HF (Hungarian Forint) (exchange rate: one HF equals 0.003302 
US dollars). As we can see from Figure 4, the inflow of premiums is not enough to compensate 
the losses, since 1e  is often negative, which defines a certain safety (solvency) level p  for 
constraint (5). It is clear that in more than 2000 scenarios out of 10000 of simulated catastrophic 
events the mandatory insurance lacks the capacity to cover losses. This calls for a more significant 
intervention by the government (burden sharing) through either increasing the level of 
compensations ν , and/or through the contingent credit. These premiums lead to considerable 
overpayment by locations (Figure 6).  
  Location-specific optimal premiums improve the situation. Figure 5 illustrates the changes 
in the total demand for contingent credit by using the optimal premiums calculated from the 
minimization of (6) for the same 25.0=v , 0=y , α  and β . The model suggests a premium rate 
on average (per location and year) equal to 0.83 million HF, which is lower than in the first case. 
Figure 5 shows that the demand for contingent credit is significantly reduced (fewer negative 
values on the horizontal axis).  
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Optimal premiums improve also overpayments per year (Figure 6, 7), i.e., the distribution of 
{ }∑ τϕ−τpi τ
j
jjj L /,0max  computed from the third term of )(xG . Figures 8, 9 show the 
distribution of uninsured losses computed from the first term of )(xG . It is evident (Figure 9) that 
the optimal premiums adjust location-specific coverage of flood losses in order to reduce 
insolvencies (negative 1e  in Figure 4) and overpayments. In the numerical experiments we used 
1.0=β=α
 as parameter values. Figures 10, 11 show further reductions of overpayments and the 
demand for contingent credit for 05.0=β=α , which are, in fact, due to further adjustment of 
location-specific coverages and premiums. 
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Figure 4. Actuarial premiums.                              Figure 5. Optimal premiums.  
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Figure 6. Actuarial premiums.                              Figure 7. Optimal premiums. 
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Figure 8. Actuarial premiums.                              Figure 9. Optimal premiums. 
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Figure 10. Risk coefficient 05.0=β=α .               Figure 11. Risk coefficient  05.0=β=α . 
 
In these experiments, apart from varying premiums, we considered also other flood loss 
sharing and mitigation strategies, e.g., heightening of the dikes, alternative shares of insurance 
coverages, etc. Here, we do not discuss these scenarios in detail. Nevertheless, they are worth 
mentioning. Similarly to premiums, for each alternative set of policies, the model estimated (in the 
form of histograms) gains and losses of all agents. For example, Figure 12 shows the insurer’s 
reserve when the dikes were heightened (and actuarial premiums). Figure 13 shows the outcomes 
for the insurer when premiums where assumed actuarial and the insurer’s coverage decreased from 
90 to 60 percent. The number of possible alternative scenarios can be very large.  
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Figure 12. Heightening of the dikes, Figure 13. Decreased insurance coverage, 
actuarial premiums. actuarial premiums. 
 
A main limitation of such scenario analysis, as discussed in Section 3, is that the evaluation 
of alternative policies does not take into account goals and constraints of agents, e.g., insolvency 
constraints of insurers, incomes of individuals, etc. Thus, the approach does not answer the 
question of policies’ robustness.  
The computer program (optimization part) was implemented using the mathematical 
software package MATLAB on a DELL GX240 personal computer. The solution time for 40 land 
units and 10000 iterations (scenarios) is about 10 minutes. The optimization procedure is easily 
restarted from different initial solutions, for new compositions of units, and distributions of 
random parameters. The solution time slightly changes with the number of decision variables and 
random parameters. It may increase with the increase of N  (unreasonably large N  may cause 
degeneracy of G - level sets) and it also depends on the scarcity of catastrophes. Important is that 
the computation time can be further reduced by implementing the so-called fast versions of the 
Monte Carlo simulations.  
6. Concluding Remarks 
In the pilot study of flood risk management in the upper Tisza region, we analyzed spatial 
and temporal heterogeneities that are typically induced by catastrophes. Main features of these 
heterogeneities are: spatial and temporal distributions and dependencies between losses; 
involvement of various agents in coping with catastrophes - local and central governments, 
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households, farmers, investors, insurers, financial markets; multiple goals, constraints, and 
perceptions of these agents with respect to catastrophes. The temporal heterogeneity in our 
experiments was modeled with respect to random time occurrence of the first catastrophic flood 
(the stopping time). We used a spatially explicit GIS-based model for policy-oriented treatment of 
catastrophes in which we accounted for spatial and temporal distribution of structural and 
agricultural values in the studied region, regional vulnerability to catastrophic floods, stability 
constraints and loss indicators for different stakeholders with regard to catastrophes. The main 
challenge addressed within the stochastic model addressed was the identification of robust 
combinations of location specific ex-ante and ex-post mitigation and adaptation strategies 
decreasing regional vulnerability measured in terms of structural and agricultural damages and, 
thus, sustained welfare growth of the region.  
In particular, we illustrated the applicability of the proposed model to analyze and improve 
spatial and temporal outcomes for individuals (locations), for the insurance pool and the 
government with respect to assumptions on location specific insurance premiums. We 
demonstrated that heterogeneous optimal premiums can decrease location-specific overpayments 
and also increase the stability of the insurance pool. In the experiments, the demand for a 
contingent credit indicates the need for additional government intervention, i.e., additional burden 
sharing by taxpayers to cover losses induced by catastrophic floods. As experiments show, another 
important issue is to perform the flood risks analysis with respect to spatial patterns of land-use 
decisions. For instance, deforestation or afforestation affect discharge curves of the catastrophe 
model, i.e., the frequencies of catastrophic floods, and their severity. Similar effects can result 
from other land use decisions, e.g., building of reservoirs (flood retention areas), the 
transformation of agricultural land to industrial complexes, the sealing of land surfaces, or changes 
in the allocation of capital values, in particular, settlements in risk prone areas.  
Changing flood frequencies, as discussed in this paper, could also result from regional or 
global climate change. A future research challenge will be to extend the proposed AMCO 
approach to other risk-related fields of global change policy analysis. 
Global change is the expression of a broad set of cumulative and interlocking changes in 
technological, economic, social and environmental conditions [39]. These changes alter locally 
varied profiles of risks and vulnerabilities. They appear to create more intense and more frequent 
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episodes of extreme events, and they may change and intensify exposure to various forms of risk, 
e.g., disease vectors and occurrence of epidemic outbreaks. A characteristic feature of global 
change impacts and adaptation/mitigation efforts is their spatial diversity and dependency. The 
main message here is that heterogeneity and uncertainty are abundant and essential. For adequate 
treatment of the resulting complex decision problems, spatially explicit and dynamic stochastic 
modeling approaches, as discussed here, can provide innovative and flexible tools for identifying 
robust and fair (with regard to multiple stakeholders) policy responses. 
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